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RECENT DECISIONS
individual principal has, although the corporation's liability for breach
of contract endures.25 It is noteworthy that similar words in the
National Banking Act have been construed by the Appellate Division
to permit removal of bank officers without subjecting the bank to
liability even for damages for breach of contract.2
6
It is well settled that courts of equity will not ordinarily enforce
contracts of personal service. This doctrine is based on sound prin-
ciples, substantive as well as procedural. Further, the public policy
of both New York and New Jersey is clear that corporations, par-
ticularly when publicly held, be managed by their boards of directors.
The intentions of the parties to a contract in this area should be
irrelevant in the face of what seems to be a strong public policy. It
can be doubted that the arbitration laws were intended to allow cir-
cumvention of this public policy by provision of an arbitration clause
in a contract of employment. A better solution might have been to
send the parties back to arbitration in order to assess damages.27
)X
BILLS AND NOTES - MUTUAL RESCISSION OF BANK DRAFT
AFTER PAYEE HAS TITLE HELD INVALID.-The purchaser of a bank
draft from defendant bank remitted it to his escrow agent with the
restrictive condition that it should be held until the merchandise,
which he had contracted to buy from the payee, had cleared the
United States Customs.' In the meanwhile, the payee transferred
his interest to the present plaintiff. After a futile request for the
draft was made to the escrowee, the plaintiff obtained a Canadian
judgment in rem for breach of contract, in pursuance of which the
court awarded him the draft. The Court of Appeals held that the
defendant drawer bank was liable to payee's successor on the draft
even though the payment had been countermanded by a subsequent
agreement between the defendant and the remitter. International
Firearms Co. v. Kingston Trust Co., 6 N.Y.2d 406, 160 N.E.2d 656,
189 N.Y.S.2d 911 (1959).
A convenient method of transacting a commercial credit venture
in which the creditor will be readily satisfied is through the purchase
25 In re Paramount Publix Corp., 90 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1937).
26 Copeland v. Melrose National Bank, 229 App. Div. 311, 241 N.Y. Supp.
429 (1st Dep't), affd mern., 254 N.Y. 632, 173 N.E. 893 (1930).
27 See Matter of Staklinski (Pyramid Elec. Co.), 6 N.Y.2d 159, 164,
160 N.E.2d 541, 543 (1959) (concurring opinion).
The remitter of the bank draft refused to complete the necessary forms
to allow the merchandise to clear through the customs, thereby making it
impossible for the payee to deliver the goods.
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of a bank draft.2 The primary benefit to the creditor is that he will
receive the order of the bank to pay the face amount 3 instead of the
promise of his individual debtor. This important factor has caused
the market place to characterize the bank draft as being the symbol
and equivalent of cash.4 The courts have equated the bank draft
to a cashier's check,5 and have stated that the rules which are ap-
plicable to the latter are also applicable to bank drafts.6
A draft is an order to the correspondent bank to pay money as
directed. It is evidence of a completed transaction. 7 By the weight
of authority the purchase of the draft results in the formation of a
debtor-creditor relationship 8 between the drawer and the holder. It
is deemed not to constitute the creation of a trust 9 or an agency 10
and is not regarded as an assignment of funds."
The remitter, even though he may surrender the draft, cannot
by himself compel the drawer to countermand payment. It is com-
2 A bank draft may be defined as a bill of exchange drawn by a bank
on its correspondent bank and usually issued at the solicitation of a stranger
who purchases and pays therefor. Kohler v. First Nat'l Bank, 157 Wash.
417, 289 Pac. 47, 49 (1930). See BaRnroN, BILLS AND NoTEs 299-300 (1943).
3 N.Y. NEOTIABLE INSTR. LAW § 111. "The drawer by drawing the in-
strument admits the existence of the payee . . . and engages that on due
presentment the instrument will be accepted and paid . . . and that if it be
dishonored . . . he will pay the amount thereof to the holder...."
4 Gravenhorst v. Zimmerman, 236 N.Y. 22, 31, 139 N.E. 766, 769 (1923).
5 Kohler v. First Nat'l Bank, 157 Wash. 417, 239 Pac. 47, 49 (1930).
A cashier's check may be defined as a bill of exchange drawn by a bank
upon itself and accepted in advance by the act of its issuance. Causey v.
Eiland, 175 Ark. 929, 1 S.W.2d 1008, 1010 (1928).
1 Kerr S.S. Co. v. Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China, 292 N.Y.
253, 262, 54 N.E2d 813, 817 (1944) ; Polotsky v. Artisans Say. Bank, 37 Del.
142, 180 Atl. 791 (1935), aff'd, 37 Del. 151, 188 Atl. 63 (1936) ; Powell Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n v. Larabie Bros. Bankers, 100 Mont. 183, 46 P.2d 697, 700
(1935); Montana-Wyoming Ass'n of Credit Men v. Commercial Nat'l Bank,
80 Mont. 174, 259 Pac. 1060, 1061 (1927); Kohler v. First Nat'l Bank, 157
Wash. 417, 289 Pac. 47, 49 (1930).
7 See Ligniti v. Mechanics and Metals Nat'l Bank, 230 N.Y. 415, 130 N.E.
597 (1921).
s Hurley v. Union Trust Co., 244 App. Div. 590, 591, 280 N.Y. Supp.
474, 477 (3d Dep't 1935); Andrews v. Alta State Bank, 206 Iowa 65, 218
N.W. 957 (1928); Powell Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Larabie Bros. Bankers, 100
Mont. 183, 46 P.2d 697 (1935); Smalley v. Queen City Bank, 94 S.W.2d
954 (Mo. Ct. App. 1936) ; State v. First State Bank, 123 Neb. 643, 243 N.W.
884 (1932).
9 Ligniti v. Mechanics & Metals Nat'l Bank, 230 N.Y. 415, 130 N.E. 597
(1921): American Express Co. v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., 239 Mass. 249,
132 N.E. 26 (1921); Beecher v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., 239 Mass. 48,
131 N.E. 338 (1921); Louisville Banking Co. v. Paine, 67 Miss. 678, 7 So.
462 (1890).
10 American Express Co. v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., 239 Mass. 249, 132
N.E. 26 (1921).
11 Harrison v. Wright, 100 Ind. 515 (1884); Clark v. Toronto Bank, 72
Kan. 1, 82 Pac. 582 (1905); Gramel v. Garner, 55 Mich. 201, 21 N.W. 418
(1884).
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pletely within the discretion of the drawer to refuse to do so.12  In
Kerr S.S. Co. v. Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China,'3
the remitter was unable to place the instrument in the possession
of the payee. The court held that the transfer of the draft in ex-
change for money paid is an executed transfer14 between the bank
and the remitter, and is characterized as a purchase and sale. Such
a transaction may not be rescinded by the remitter even when super-
vening war delays the presentment indefinitely. In general, the re-
mitter is the recipient of no promises made to himself and therefore
he is in no position to claim that because of unperformed promises
he is entitled to a return of his money.' 5 In Gellert v. Bank of
Calif. Natl Ass'n,'0 the court allowed rescission because the remitter,
who had intended to make a gift of the draft to the payee, died before
delivery and it was forever legally impossible for payee to obtain title.
Clearly, the drawer of the instrument could not rescind unilaterally
because the remitter does have rights in assumpsit on the instrument
and it is doubtful whether they could be defeated in such a manner.17
The paucity of the cases in this latter area may be explained by the
fact that in an ordinary situation when the draft has been dishonored,
the drawer will be sued by the payee on the instrument rather than
by the remitter for money had and received.
In Kohler v. First Nat'l Bank, ' the court held that the drawer
bank is not permitted to countermand payment and rescind even
under a mutual agreement with the remitter when the payee is a
holder in due course. Clearly his rights dictate such a conclusion.
To do otherwise would make the draft of no greater value than a
personal check. Such a result would unsettle the commercial world.
The drawer has been allowed to stop payment and rescind when the
possessor was not a holder in due course but had obtained the draft
through a gambling transaction. The theory was that since the
negotiation was void, the title to the instrument had not passed. 19
The underlying principle in this area is that once the draft has
12 Polotsky v. Artisans Sav. Bank, 37 Del. 142, 180 At. 791 (1935), aff'd,
37 Del. 151, 188 Ati. 63 (1936).
13292 N.Y. 253, 54 N.E.2d 813 (1944).
'4Accord, Moe v. Bank of United States, 211 App. Div. 519, 207 N.Y.
Supp. 347 (2d Dep't 1925); Polotsky v. Artisans Say. Bank, 37 Del. 142,
180 Atl. 791 (1935), aff'd, 37 Del. 151, 188 AtI. 63 (1936).
15 Schweitzer v. Fargo, 255 N.Y. 60, 173 N.E. 923 (1930).
16 107 Ore. 162, 214 Pac. 377 (1923).
17 The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law contains no provision which
expressly deals with the status of a remitter or any other person similarly
situated. Therefore, as provided for by § 196, his rights are to be determined
by the law merchant. See Beutel, Rights of Remnitters and Other O tners
Not Within the Teior of Negotiable Instrumenis, 12 MINN. L. REV. 584
(1928).
is 157 Wash. 417, 289 Pac. 47 (1930).
19 Hurley v. Union Trust Co., 244 App. Div. 590, 280 N.Y. Supp. 474
(3d Dep't 1935).
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been issued by the bank and the bank chooses to comply with the
remitter's request for rescission it must do so at its own risk and
must undergo the consequences of possible suit.2 0  In the principal
case the Court under principles of comity gave effect to the judg-
ment of the Canadian court. This it may do as long as New York
State public policy is not violated.21 That there is an implied obli-
gation of good faith binding the parties to a contract not to delib-
erately frustrate its performance cannot be doubted.2 2 This Canadian
judgment was recognized not as per se binding upon the defendant
but only as the establishment of a link in the plaintiff's chain of
title.23
The defendant's contention that it was not a party to the
Canadian action was defeated with a well reasoned answer. The
defendant ". . . no more needed to be a party . . . than the United
States Government would need to have been, if its currency had
been the subject of the [escrow] deposit." 24 To have allowed the
defendant's contention, the Court would have had to allow the whole
question of the remitter's actions to be relitigated. The Court held
that when legal title to a bank draft is in the payee or his successor,
it is sufficient to prevent a countermanding of payment. It is not
necessary that the payee be a holder in due course. This decision
clearly defines the obligation of the drawer in that once the draft
has been validly issued, it is irrevocable as against all legal holders.
Cashier's checks may be countermanded, provided they are not in
the hands of a holder in due course, for fraud and for failure of con-
sideration for which they were issued.25 It would seem that since
neither fraud nor failure of consideration was present in the instant
case, the rule is still applicable to bank drafts.
The law of negotiable instruments, being a substantive law, is a
creature of growth. It is founded on the customs and needs of mer-
chants, and represents a combined result of reason and experience.
It should keep pace with and respond to commercial usage if it is
to be of value.2 6 Holdings such as the present one do much to en-
20 See Polatsky v. Artisans Say. Bank, 37 Del. 142, 180 At. 791 (1935),
aff'd, 37 Del. 151, 188 Ati. 63 (1936).
21 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
22 O'Neil Supply Co. v. Petroleum Heat & Power Co., 280 N.Y. 50, 54-55,
19 N.E.2d 676, 678 (1939); Wigand v. Bachmann-Bechtel Brewing Co., 222
N.Y. 272, 277, 118 N.E. 618, 619 (1918).
23 Barr v. Gratz, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 213 (1819); Israel v. Wood Dolson
Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 134 N.E.2d 97, 151 N.Y.S.Zd 1 (1956); Railroad Equip.
Co. v. Blair, 145 N.Y. 607, 610, 39 N.E. 962, 963 (1895).
24 International Firearms Co. v. Kingston Trust Co., 6 N.Y.2d 406, 411, 160
N.E.2d 656, 658, 189 N.Y.S.2d 911, 914 (1959).
25 Kinder v. Fisher Nat'l Bank, 93 Ind. App. 213, 218, 177 N.E. 904, 906
(1931); Dakota Transfer & Storage Co. v. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 86 N.W.2d 639 (N.D. 1957).
26 McCornick & Co. Bankers v. Gem State Oil Prods. Co., 38 Idaho 470,
222 Pac. 286, 287 (1923).
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hance the usefulness and the validity of a bank draft. The drafts are
more readily acceptable and the instrument is realistically equated
to cash.
M
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CoMMERCE CLAUSE-RAILROAD HE=
LIABLE FOR SAFETY APPLIANCE ACTS VIOLATIONs.-Defendant rail-
road prevailed at trial and primary appellate levels in a suit for
statutory penalties under the Safety Appliance Acts. The violations
alleged were based on movements of rolling stock by yard crews and
engines without operable air-brakes save those on the engines. The
acts, by permissive regulation of the ICC, require that all cars in-
volved in interstate commerce be equipped with power-brakes and
that eighty-five per cent of the cars in any train have them in oper-
ating condition. The journeys in question, while only covering two
miles, were intersected by roads and railroad tracks. The Supreme
Court, in reversing the Court of Appeals, held that such movements
constituted train movements within the purview of the acts and were
therefore subject to the brake regulations. United States v. Seaboard
Air Line R.R., 361 U.S. 78 (1959).
The Safety Appliance Acts,' the first of which was promulgated
in 1893, had as their ultimate object the increased protection of rail-
road passengers and employees.2 Their immediate objective related
to the compulsory use of certain safety devices, commencing with
the equipping of all rolling stock with power brakes and automatic
couplers,3 and secondly, the use of air-brakes operable from the en-
gine 4 in varying quantities.5 The purpose was to discourage use of
hand brakes and pin-bar couplings through imposition of a $100 fine
127 Stat. 531 (1893), 32 Stat. 943 (1903), 36 Stat. 298 (1910), as
amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1958). Modifications have been made by means
of ICC regulations.2 Preamble, 27 Stat. 531 (1893). See, e.g., Delk v. St. Louis & S.F.R.R.,
220 U.S. 580, 582 (1911) ; Andersen v. Bingham & G. Ry., 169 F.2d 328, 330
(10th Cir. 1948); United States v. New York Cent. & H.R.R., 205 Fed. 428,
429 (W.D.N.Y. 1913); United States v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 149 Fed.
486, 488 (S.D. Iowa 1906).
3 See Delk v. St. Louis & S.F.R.R., supra note 2.
427 Stat. 531 (1893), 45 U.S.C. § 1 (1958). But see Richmond, F. &
P.R.R. v. Brooks, 197 F.2d 404, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (split control of brakes
between engineer and conductor, apparently a departure from the act, is
allowed because it fulfills the original legislative intent).
527 Stat. 532 (1893), 45 U.S.C. § 1 (1958) (called for sufficient air-brakes
to be installed so as to preclude use of the common hand brake) ; 32 Stat. 943
(1903), 45 U.S.C. § 9 (1958) (wherein the percentage was set at 507o and the
ICC was empowered to alter the rate following suitable hearings and delibera-
tions) ; 11 ICC Rep. 429 (1905) (the percentage was raised to 75%) ; 49 CFR
132.1 (1958) (raised in 1910 to 85%, the present ratio).
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